Tim Roughgarden

Results: 191



#Item
81Online algorithms / Applied mathematics / Mathematics / Cache / Computer science / Analysis of algorithms / Virtual memory / Sorting algorithms / Cache algorithms / Competitive analysis / CPU cache / Algorithm

CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #3: Online Paging and Resource Augmentation∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-10-06 12:17:28
82Mathematics / Operations research / Linear programming / Combinatorial optimization / Convex optimization / Submodular set function / Valuation / Approximation algorithm / Randomized rounding / Ellipsoid method / Mathematical optimization / Algorithm

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #10: Coverage Valuations and Convex Rounding∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 5, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-06-11 16:25:54
83Auction theory / Auctions / Game theory / Marketing / Business / First-price sealed-bid auction / Vickrey auction / Sponsored search auction / Auction / Bidding / Proxy bid / Generalized second-price auction

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-12-03 15:09:27
84Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Mathematics / Decision theory / Vickrey auction / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Matroid / Linear programming

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-20 13:32:00
85Mathematics / Algebra / Game theory / Gaming / Non-cooperative games / Decision theory / Game artificial intelligence / Minimax / Zero-sum game / Expected value / Matrix / Weight

CS261: A Second Course in Algorithms Lecture #12: Applications of Multiplicative Weights to Games and Linear Programs∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 11, 2016

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-02-17 12:57:28
86Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Market economics) / Economy / Vickrey auction / First-price sealed-bid auction / Auction / Quantile / Monopoly / Valuation / Bayesian-optimal mechanism

CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13
87Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Mathematics / Decision theory / Submodular set function / Competitive equilibrium / Gross substitutes / First-price sealed-bid auction / Auction / Valuation

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #7: Submodular Valuations∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-04 12:07:39
88Mathematics / Algebraic geometry / Gross substitutes / Valuation / Competitive equilibrium / Submodular set function / Mechanism design

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Bonus Lecture: Gross Substitutes and Greedy Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 7, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-25 14:30:24
89Graph theory / Computational complexity theory / Mathematics / NP-complete problems / Clique problem / Planted clique / Graph partition / Graph coloring / Clique / Time complexity / Maximal independent set / Pathwidth

CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #10: Planted and Semi-Random Graph Models∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 22,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-01-05 12:59:35
90Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / Revelation principle / Auction / Prior-independent mechanism / English auction / Incentive compatibility

A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37
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